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Abstract: 
Intra-household inequalities have long been a source of concern for policy design, but there is very 
little evidence. The current practice of ignoring inequality within households could lead to an 
underestimation of both overall inequality and poverty levels, as well as to the misclassification of 
some individuals as regards to their poverty status. Using a novel survey for Senegal in which 
consumption data were collected at a disaggregated level, this paper quantifies these various effects. In 
total, two opposing effects, one on mean and one on inequality, compensate each other in terms of the 
overall poverty rate, but individual poverty statuses are affected. Intra-household consumption 
inequalities accounts for 14% of inequality in Senegal. We uncover the fact that household structure 
and organization are key correlates of intra-household inequality and individual risk of poverty.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Inter-personal inequality in living standards within households is a largely uncharted territory. 
It is unlikely that individuals within the same household always have the same living 
standards as income and resources are not necessarily pooled, and members do not share in 
them equally. If this is the case, inequality levels might well be seriously underestimated. 
Further, this is a question of major policy relevance as unequal access to resources might push 
vulnerable household members to alarmingly low consumption levels. However, gauging the 
extent of intra-household inequality remains an empirical challenge, since adequate data are 
rarely at hand.   
The purpose of this paper is to provide a measure and a description of intra-household 
inequality in the case of Senegal using a novel survey in which household consumption data 
were collected at a disaggregated level, evaluate how it alters our assessment of consumption 
distribution in the country and identify which categories of household members are most at 
risk to suffer from relative deprivation.  
The distribution of consumption in West-African economies is often considered to be less 
unequal than in other parts of Africa and Latin America; the Gini indices are around 40%, 
while they reach the range 50 to 60% in many Austral African or Latin American countries 
(see fig 2.9, chap. 2; World Bank 2005). Still, not only is income inequality fairly high 
(Beegle at al. 2016), but, as pointed out by Cogneau et al (2006), it is accompanied by low 
intergenerational social mobility, suggesting that inequality is weighing on individual life 
trajectories.  
The above inequality assessment is based on standard consumption surveys, which collect 
information at the level of the household as a whole, often by interviewing its head. Individual 
consumption levels are derived from this aggregate measure. This might be a poor 
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approximation of reality in the context of Senegal, where households extend far beyond the 
parents-children nucleus, and the chances for unequal distribution of resources among 
household members are particularly large. The household structure is in fact quite complex, 
due to polygamy, to the frequent presence of foster children (Beck et al 2015) and of extended 
family members.  
Most of the empirical work attempting to exhibit intra-household inequalities concentrates on 
food consumption or health and education (see Haddad et al. 1997 for an excellent 
introduction to the early research on these topics). More recently, some works based on 
structural models of intra-household allocation of resources (collective household models, see 
Chiappori 1988) deliver estimates of consumption shares by type of household members for 
nuclear households (Dunbar et al. 2013). In general, these estimates cannot be confronted to 
the actual sharing of resources, as these data are rarely available. The only exceptions we 
know of are two recent papers, using Bangladeshi data and concentrating on food 
consumption (Bargain et al. 2018, Brown et al. 2019).  The complex structure and budgetary 
organization of West-African households with separate spheres of spending suggest that the 
Pareto optimality assumption supporting those structural models is unlikely to be verified (see 
Baland and Ziparo 2018). Hence, this route might not be particularly promising in such 
context. 
Recent attempts at describing intra-household resource allocation with non-monetary 
measures of poverty also exist. Klasen and Lahoti (2016) study inter-individual inequality in 
India using individual multidimensional poverty indices (MPI), compared with the 
distribution of a household-based MPI. They find that intra-household inequality accounts for 
30% of total inequality. More relevant to our context, Brown, Ravallion and van de Walle 
(forthcoming) use nutritional status as a proxy for individual poverty and observe that in 
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Africa, around one half of undernourished women and children are not found in the (asset-) 
poorest 40% of households.  
In addition, we now have strong evidence that individuals within a household may not be 
equally vulnerable to shocks (Case, Paxson and Ableidinger 2004, Dercon and Krishnan 
2000, De Vreyer and Nilsson 2019, Rose 1999). 
Despite these efforts, since very few datasets permit researchers to measure individual 
consumption and thereby intra-household inequality, available estimates of poverty and 
inequality simply ignore this issue. Standard measures of poverty and inequality are 
calculated assuming that resources are shared equally within the household (with some 
normalization for size and demographic composition). From the conceptual standpoint alone, 
viewing poverty as essentially an individual state requires us to go beyond this approach. 
From the policy point of view, neglecting intra-household inequality is likely to introduce 
biases in the poverty and inequality measures. Less obvious is the fact that household-based 
consumption data collection could also lead to an underestimation of mean consumption, 
which might in turn bias poverty estimates upwards.   
We conducted an unusual survey aimed at better understanding household structure and intra-
household resource allocation in Senegal (Poverty and Family Structure survey, hereafter 
PSF, see De Vreyer et al. 2008). The consumption section of the survey has been designed to 
collect consumption expenditures at the level of small groups within the household, and 
involved the interview of several household members.1 The data can be used to construct a 
measure of consumption at the cell level, allowing a more precise assessment of individual 
consumption than permitted by traditional surveys.    
                                                             
1 The way these subgroups have been defined is described in detail in section 2.1.  
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These data are very revealing on intra-household inequalities. In general, food expenditures 
appear equitably distributed as far as their actual inter-individual allocation is observable 
(Meals are mostly collectively taken from a single dish, see section 2.3). Differences emerge 
with respect to non-food expenditures. We evaluate intra-household inequalities to account 
for 14% of total inequalities in Senegal. This number is shown to be 42% of the maximum 
that could be reached given the very large share of common expenditures (including food) in 
this context. This might be an underestimation, given the difficulty to observe inequality in 
food consumption. The overall consumption inequality is much higher than what is commonly 
thought, with a Gini index estimated to reach 47.1%, before we even factor in intra-household 
inequality.2 Further, holding account of the intra-household inequality we can observe leads 
to revise upward the overall level of consumption inequality, up to nearly 50% for the Gini 
coefficient. 
We find poverty measures very comparable to those produced with a more standard 
household survey conducted only a few months earlier. On the one hand, the mode of data 
collection (more than one respondent per household in PSF) seems to allow for a more 
complete recording of consumption leading to a 15% higher level of average consumption. 
On the other hand, in this context, taking into account intra-household inequalities increases 
the share of individuals found below the poverty line. Remarkably, in the case of Senegal, 
these two differences compensate each other so that the overall evaluation of poverty level 
doesn’t depend on the survey used. The poverty rate reaches about 43% at the time of our 
survey when using a basic needs poverty threshold. We further discuss how ignoring inter-
                                                             
2 The Gini index published by the World Bank reaches 40.3% in 2011 (World Development Indicators). 
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personal inequality leads to flawed poverty diagnostics. We find that nearly 14% of non-poor 
households contain at least one poor cell. There are also non-poor cells in poor households. 
We conduct a number of robustness checks. Worries that the inequality results could be in 
part driven by measurement errors are tackled with corrections of the inequality estimates as 
well as with simulation techniques. Qualitatively, all results stand for plausible levels of 
measurement errors. Further, poverty estimates are obviously dependent on the poverty line 
and we explore sensitivity to this choice. We also examine how results are affected by the 
equivalence scale used to weigh individuals within households.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the data collected, and examine 
the likely implications of observing consumption at an infra household level on estimated 
inequalities and poverty levels. In section 3, we describe intra-household inequality and its 
contribution to overall inter-individual inequality. Section 4 is dedicated to the revision of 
poverty assessments brought about by the prevalence of intra-household inequalities, and 
Section 5 presents some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. THE “POVERTY AND FAMILY STRUCTURE” SURVEY 
 
2.1. THE SURVEY 
The PSF Survey was conducted in Senegal in 2006-2007. It results from the cooperation 
between the National Statistical Office of Senegal and a team of French researchers.3 It is a 
                                                             
3 Momar B. Sylla and Matar Gueye of the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie of Sénégal (ANSD), as 
well as Philippe De Vreyer (University of Paris-Dauphine and IRD-DIAL), Sylvie Lambert (Paris School of Economics-
INRA), and Abla Safir (World Bank), all designed the survey. The data collection was conducted by the ANSD, thanks to 
the funding of the IDRC (International Development Research Center), INRA Paris, and CEPREMAP. The survey is 
described in detail in De Vreyer et al., 2008. 
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nationally representative survey covering 1,800 households spread over 150 clusters drawn 
randomly from the census districts so as to insure a nationally representative sample. About 
1,780 records can be exploited. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, we exclude 
households with missing consumption information or incoherent records.4 We are left with a 
sample of 1762 households. Among them more than half live in rural areas, while 28% are in 
Dakar. 
The survey collects the usual information on individual characteristics, as well as a detailed 
description of household structure, consumption, and budgetary arrangements. 
 
HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE 
In the PSF survey, a household is defined as the set of co-residing individuals who recognize 
the authority of a given household head. Table 1 describes the main characteristics of 
Senegalese households. In the PSF sample they are large, with about eight members on 
average and a dependency ratio nearly equal to 50%. Households are typically 
multigenerational and extended both horizontally and vertically, with 28.2% of members that 
are neither the head, nor one of his wives or children.5 Two thirds of households include such 
“extended” family members.  
Polygamous unions are common, with 24.7% of married men and 38.7% of married women 
engaged in such unions. Most of these comprise a husband and two wives (only 20% of 
polygamous unions have more than two wives). We find that 31% of polygamous men have 
                                                             
4 Details are given in Appendix A. 
5 Vertical extensions refer to the cases where the household includes more than 2 generations of members, i.e. 
presence of grand-parents or grand-children. Horizontal extensions subsume situations where several family 
members pertaining to the generation of the head cohabit. It could be for example married siblings of the head or of 
his wife.  
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non-cohabiting wives. In this work, we ignore the consumption of non-co-residing spouses of 
the household head. 
Field interviews conducted at the early stages of the PSF project showed that within 
Senegalese households, it is possible to distinguish sub-groups of household members that are 
at least partly autonomous, in particular with respect to their budget management. To best 
capture intra-household structure and resource allocation, the survey was designed to record 
this internal household organisation. Each household was divided into groups, called “cells”, 
whereby the head forms a cell with unaccompanied dependent members (a widowed parent, a 
child whose mother is not present in the household, an unmarried sibling when no parent co-
resides…); each wife of the head, her children, and any other dependents then form separate 
cells, as do any other adults with dependent (such as a married brother or a married son, for 
example). A similar approach had already been used to structure households in the 1988 
Senegalese census (van de Walle and Gaye, 2006) and seemed very intuitive to enumerators 
who had to implement the survey. In the PSF sample, more than a third of households contain 
at least three cells (see Table 1 below). 6 Households have on average 2.5 cells, but that 
uncovers a wide diversity of situation. In fact, nearly 18% of the households have only one 
cell, while 38% have 3 cells or more. Nuclear households (composed of husband, wife and 
their unmarried children) account for about 40% of the households, while nearly 49% include 
some type of horizontal (siblings, but also uncles/aunts or nephews/nieces) or vertical 
extensions (parents, grand-parents, grand-children). The cohabitation of 3 generations or more 
is particularly frequent in rural areas, where it is the case for 44% of the households (vs 22% 
in Dakar). The remaining extended households include cousins or non-family members. 
Despite these frequent extensions, only in 15.8% of the households do we observe more than 
                                                             
6 Half of the households with 3 cells or more are headed by a polygamous household head.  
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one married man with at least one wife present in the household. About one fifth of the 
households are headed by a woman and two-thirds by someone without any formal schooling 
(either no education at all or only koranic educations).  
When zooming to the cell level, 40% are headed by the household head (a man in nearly 80% 
of the cases), 35% by his spouse, and 11% by one of his children or a son or daughter-in-law. 
Cells other than that of the household head are in vast majority (81%) headed by a woman. 
Nearly a third of the cells include at least two adults above the age of 21 (47% if considering 
individuals over 15), while the number of children below 15 varies from 0 (for nearly 44% of 
the cells) to 8, with an average of 1.36. Nearly half of the cells are those of a mother and her 
children. Women also tend to have under their responsibility grand-children, younger 
unmarried siblings or nephews and nieces. 
Table 1a: Household characteristics 
 N mean Min max 
Household size 1,762 8.09 1 44 
number of cells 1,762 2.49 1 12 
single cell household 1,762 17.70 0 100 
hh with 3 cells or more 1,762 37.82 0 100 
hh with 2 couples of more 1,762 15.76 0 100 
nb of children 0 - 4 y.o. 1,762 1.23 0 10 
nb of children 5 - 14 y.o. 1,762 2.15 0 13 
nb of elderly over 66 y.o. 1,762 0.30 0 4 
nuclear household 1,762 40.55 0 100 
hh include vertical extensions 1,762 35.12 0 100 
hh includes horizontal extensions 1,762 27.41 0 100 
hh includes vertical and/or horizontal ext. 1,762 48.93 0 100 
hh includes other types of member 1,762 30.31 0 100 
share of non nuclear hh members 1,762 28.22 0 96 
hh includes non nuclear hh members 1,762 66.07 0 100 
Dakar 1,762 28.13 0 100 
Other urban area 1,762 19.78 0 100 
Rural 1,762 52.09 0 100 
Female hh head 1,762 20.59 0 100 
hh head is polygamous 1,762 29.44 0 100 
hh head is polygamous man 1,762 23.51 0 100 
hh head is polygamous woman 1,762 5.93 0 100 
hh head has no formal schooling 1,762 64.68 0 100 
age of hh head 1,761 49.85 18 93 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations using sampling weights. Nuclear households are households containing only the head, his wife 
(wives) and their children (biological, adopted or fostered). Vertical extensions designate parents, grand-parents, grand-children. 
Horizontal extensions include sibling, nephew and uncles of the household head. “Households with two couples or more” indicates that 
the household contain at least two married men accompanied by at least one wife each.   
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 Table 1b: Cell characteristics 
 N mean Min max 
Cell size 4,293 3.25 1 15 
nb of children 0 - 4 y.o. in cell 4,293 0.49 0 4 
nb of children 5 - 14 y.o. in cell 4,293 0.86 0 7 
nb of children less than 15 y.o. in cell 4,293 1.36 0 8 
nb of elderly over 66 y.o. in cell 4,293 0.12 0 3 
cell with 2 adults (15+) or more % 4,293 46.69 0 100 
cell with 2 adults (21+) or more % 4,293 31.02 0 100 
cell without any children % 4,293 43.69 0 100 
cell with mother + children only % 4,293 47.44 0 100 
cell head is a woman % 4,293 56.81 0 100 
                    Excl. household head 2,531 81.19 0 100 
cell head is the hh head % 4,293 40.23 0 100 
cell head is a male hh head% 4,293 31.95 0 100 
cell head is the spouse of hh head % 4,293 35.43 0 100 
cell head is a child of hh head % 4,293 8.86 0 100 
cell head is son/daughter in law of hh head % 4,293 2.15 0 100 
cell head is a sibling of hh head % 4,293 4.46 0 100 
cell head is a remote parent or non related % 4,293 5.48 0 100 
cell head is polygamous man % 4,293 10.55 0 100 
                    Excl. household head 2,531 1.83 0 100 
cell head is polygamous woman % 4,293 22.18 0 100 
                    Excl. household head 2,531 33.11 0 100 
cell head has no formal schooling % 4,293 67.00 0 100 
                    Excl. household head 2,531 68.57 0 100 
age of cell head 4,292 42.18 0 98 
                    Excl. household head 2,530 37.03 0 98 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations using sampling weights. 
 
 
CONSUMPTION 
Contrary to traditional consumption surveys that only aim at estimating the level of household 
consumption, PSF is designed to approximate, as much as possible, individual access to 
resources. To design the questionnaire, we built on the fact that consumptions common to 
various cells in the household appeared clearly defined, as well as the responsibilities for 
paying for those consumptions, while cells’ own resources turned out to be not entirely pooled 
within the households. We conceived the survey so as to capture this detailed information. 
Consumption data are collected in four distinct parts: food taken at home; household common 
consumption expenditures, including consumption of home-produced food; cell specific 
expenditures (such as expenses for clothing of the cell members, mobile phone, 
transportation, or food taken outside the home); and finally expenses shared between several 
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cells (but not common to the whole household). From this data, per capita consumption is 
computed at the cell level. Common consumption expenditures are attributed to cells in 
proportion to the share of household members they include. Food expenditures are compiled 
based on a detailed account of who shares which meal and how much money is specifically 
used to prepare the meal.7 Each cell is ascribed its share in the food expenditures for the 
meals it joined in. For those meals, we have to assume food is shared evenly among 
participants. In fact, meals are often taken collectively from one common dish and individual 
food intakes are not observable. Though food expenditures for meals at home are often shared 
by the whole household, in 17% of households, subgroups emerge that take some or all of 
their meals separately, making room for unequal food consumption among household 
members. In addition, some members take parts of their meals outside the home. In any event, 
non-food expenditures naturally offer wider possibilities of divergence within households. 
All the analyses presented in this paper exclude housing expenses. In this survey, only a very 
small share of the sample declares paying a rent for their dwelling. In fact, when everyone 
lives in adobe houses they built, as is the case in many parts of the country, the market price 
for the rental of such a dwelling simply doesn’t exist. In such a situation, it is hardly possible 
to use the data to impute rents to home owners. We also exclude health expenditures, as inter 
personal differences in this dimension could reflect differences in needs. Hence, the term 
“total consumption” used in this paper refers to total consumption except housing (rent) 
expenses and health expenditures.8 
                                                             
7 The DQ, « Dépense quotidienne », the name Senegalese give to the amount of money a woman has at her disposal to 
buy the fresh ingredients for the meals of the day. One of the husband’s duties is to provide the DQ. See Appendix A for 
more details on PSF survey design. 
8 According to ANSD (2007), in 2005-2006, more than 80% of households in Senegal were owners of their housing. 
Less than 16% were renting it, and only 2.6% in rural areas. This leaves a very small number of observations to 
compute meaningful imputed rents, unless a very large sample is available. Even in the ESPS sample (see Appendix A), 
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It is important to note that the survey is designed so that information collected at the cell level 
is not the expenses made by the cell members, but actually those made by anyone, whether a 
member of the cell or the household or not, to the benefit of cell members. Long training 
insured that enumerators understood the nuance. For example, any expenses made by the head 
of household for the clothing of his children are recorded in the cell where the children are 
listed, more often than not that of their mother, distinct from the one of their father. In 
addition, the contributors to each of these expenditures are also registered.  
A measure of total cell consumption is then constructed, adding expenditures specific to the 
cell and not shared with any other cell, plus the cell imputed part of the expenditures shared 
with other cells and of the household joint expenditures. This allows us to detect unequal 
consumption levels within households. Our most individualized measure of consumption is 
then the per capita cell consumption (or per adult equivalent consumption, if equivalence 
scales weighing children less than adults are used).9 
In what follows, we therefore talk of per capita (or per adult equivalent) cell consumption 
when we measure consumption per capita at the cell level, while the term per capita (or per 
adult equivalent) household consumption designates the measure obtained with the more 
"traditional" way of measuring individual consumption, when individuals' access to resources 
is estimated from the aggregate household measure of consumption. Note nevertheless that 
the household consumption obtained by aggregating consumption of all cells is not similar to 
what would have been observed if consumption had been recorded directly at the household 
level. This point is detailed in appendix A. The comparison between the inequality and 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
which includes 13559 households, the imputed rent for owner households in rural areas is based on the observation 
of rents paid by 171 households (on a total of 4987 rural households). 
9 To maintain comparability with existing works on poverty in Senegal, we use the same equivalence scale as that of 
Ndoye et al. (2009): one consumption unit for each adult, and one half for each child less than 15 years old. We test for 
the robustness of our results to this choice in section 5. 
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poverty assessments reached when using one or the other measure of consumption is central 
for the analysis presented in this paper. 
 
2.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY AND INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT 
In this section we examine how the specific design of the PSF survey may impact the 
measurement of consumption compared to that of regular surveys, and how it may change 
inequality and poverty estimates based on household consumption levels.  
Collecting data at the cell level implies that several members of the household are 
contributing information to the consumption survey. Since the household head doesn’t 
directly observe all individual expenditures, in particular in a context where individual 
resources are not public knowledge within the household (see Boltz, Marazyan and Villar, 
2015, Ziparo, 2014, Baland, Guirkinger and Mali, 2011), interviewing other household 
members allows to record expenditures that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. Proxy 
reporting as a potential source of underestimation was mentioned by Deaton (2005). 
Furthermore, the sheer fact that consumption is recorded in a more disaggregated manner 
might allow for a better recall (see Deaton 1997; Beegle et al. 2012). However, adding more 
respondents could also increase the amount of noise. If noise dominates, that should not 
introduce any systematic difference with regular household consumption surveys. Otherwise, 
increasing the number of respondents should lead to a more exhaustive recollection of 
consumption, and the consumption measured in PSF should be greater than in regular surveys, 
the more so for more complex households. One then expects the differences to increase with 
the number of cells. 
We use data from the Enquête Suivi de la Pauvreté au Sénégal (ESPS) collected in 2005 to 
explore this conjecture. Since this survey is the one used by the Senegalese Government and 
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international agencies to compute poverty and inequality statistics for the country, it is worth 
examining how the measures obtained from PSF differ from those obtained from ESPS. The 
comparison is far from trivial, however, because both surveys differ by many aspects that 
could be of consequences. Indeed, differences in design are well known to engender 
divergence in consumption measures, and it is important to try to assess the extent to which 
divergence between surveys is due to intra-household inequality rather than to any other 
source of disparity. 
Appendix A details the comparison. First, stratification of the samples is different, with in 
particular a greater share of observations from the Dakar region in PSF than in ESPS. 
Sampling weights can be used to recover nationally representative samples from both surveys. 
But important differences persist even between weighted samples, and in order to improve 
comparability we chose to reweight ESPS observations using propensity scores obtained from 
regressions of the probability for a given observation to be in the PSF sample rather than the 
ESPS one, so as to make both samples exactly similar. Second, ESPS and PSF differ in their 
expenditure coverage, as ESPS includes taxes and ceremonial expenses that PSF does not 
collect. We therefore limit the comparison to the consumption of goods and services listed in 
both surveys. Further, for reasons explained in section 2.1, rents are also excluded. The final 
lists cover the exact same categories of goods but divided in 59 items in ESPS and 55 in PSF. 
Now, while ESPS treats food expenditures in the same way as any other expenses, the PSF 
questionnaire replicates the food spending patterns of Senegalese households by recording 
separately the DQ (“dépenses quotidienne”) spent on fresh food often on a daily basis, and the 
bulky purchases of staple food made less frequently by the household head. Finally, recall 
periods are also different, as ESPS imposes recall period that vary with the type of goods 
(from 1 month to 1 year) while PSF lets the respondent choose the recall period he feels 
corresponds best to the rhythm of purchase (12 modalities are proposed, from 1 day to 1 
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year). Despite the restriction to strictly comparable sets of expenditures, the differences in the 
detail of the lists and in the recall periods can induce divergence in the measured consumption 
levels, as is now well documented in the literature (see Beegle et al. 2012 for a survey). In 
total, in this case, it is unclear whether any systematic divergence can be expected (Appendix 
A discusses this in more detail). 
We observe that the total amount of annual expenditures per capita in PSF is significantly 
higher than in ESPS (328000 FCFA versus 285000, a difference of 15%). We can compare 
how this varies by household structure (appendix Table A2.2) and we show that for 
individuals living alone and for single cell households there are no significant differences to 
speak of, while households composed of more cells display larger differences. Distance 
between consumption estimates of the two surveys is maximal for households with the most 
complex structure, those with several cells among which at least one contains members that 
are neither a spouse, nor a child or a grand-child of the household head. This pattern is very 
consistent with the idea that the share of the consumption directly observed by the household 
head decreases when the number of potential decision makers in terms of consumption 
increases. Mobilizing several respondents would then allow a better measure of actual 
household consumption. When concentrating on food, PSF records higher consumption for 
most types of households, consistent with the fact that the decomposition between DQ and 
infrequent food purchases permits a better recall of food spending (appendix Table A2.1).10  
This difference in consumption estimates is in itself an important result. It suggests that 
traditional surveys in countries where individuals within the household do not fully share the 
information on their resources and on their expenditures are indeed likely to seriously 
underestimate consumption. In addition to varying with household structure, such 
                                                             
10 Clearly, collecting data at a more disaggregated level also induces a risk of additional measurement error. We will 
therefore assess the sensitivity of the results of our analysis to measurement errors. 
16 
 
underestimation is probably more important for households in the upper part of the 
consumption distribution. In fact, poor households have less often several income earners or 
transfer recipients, so that opportunities for individual, unnoticed, expenditures are plausibly 
less frequent.  Figure A.1 in appendix A confirms that the differences are more important at 
higher levels of consumption.11  
As may be expected, we find more inequality in PSF than in ESPS data. Using per capita 
household expenditures, the Gini index is 47.1%, quite a bit higher than what we find in ESPS 
(38.9%) (using the series restricted so as to be comparable to PSF) and in the WDI (40.3% for 
2011).12 With such level of inequality, Senegal would be placed about 37 ranks higher in the 
ranking of countries by inequality level (computed from standard consumption data), from the 
62nd position to the 25th one, between Venezuela and Chile.13 As we shall see in the next 
section, factoring in intra-household inequality will push Senegal even upward on the ladder 
of inequalities. 
How does PSF modify the assessment of poverty? In order to answer this question we first 
need to define poverty. Two poverty lines are selected, following the basic needs approach. 
The lowest, nutrition, line corresponds to the cost of the food basket that provides at least 
2400 kcal per day. The second line is a basic needs poverty line, used as the national poverty 
threshold in Senegal. It is obtained by augmenting the food poverty threshold with the amount 
of resources that is necessary to cover individual basic needs other than nutrition. This amount 
is established through the observation of the average non-food consumption of households for 
                                                             
11 The fact that the underestimation of consumption is not distribution neutral pleads against anchoring poverty 
measure to National Accounts estimates of consumption, as it is likely to result in an overestimation of poor 
household consumption levels, following an argument made by Ravallion (2000). 
12 It is slightly lower when using per adult equivalent measure of consumption. See Table C1 in the Appendix. 
13 Country ranking by GINI index (Most recent World Bank estimate). 
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which food consumption per adult equivalent belongs to an interval of plus or minus 5% 
around the food poverty threshold (see Appendix A).  
Values of the two poverty lines for Dakar, other towns and rural areas separately are reported 
in table 2. The nutrition poverty line is very close to the $1.25 (PPP 2005) international line 
(that would be equal to 366 CFA francs at the time of our survey). A $2 line would 
correspond to 586 CFA francs. 
Table 2: Value of the poverty thresholds 
 Nutrition poverty line Basic needs poverty line 
Dakar 396 835 
Other towns 369 647 
Rural areas 356 558 
Source: PSF survey, authors' calculations. Values are given in CFA francs. Numbers correspond to daily 
expenditures per adult equivalent. Equivalent scale: 0.5: children 0 to 14 years old; 1: adults. 
 
Appendix Table A3.2 shows the values of the FGT indices (headcount, poverty gap and 
squared poverty gap) obtained with both surveys and poverty lines. Not much difference is 
found between the two surveys. PSF finds more people under the nutrition threshold (16.7% 
versus 12.5%), but less under the basic needs one (42.8% versus 45%). Using the Datt and 
Ravallion decomposition framework (Datt and Ravallion 1992), we can decompose the 
difference in the poverty measures from the 2 surveys into its “growth” (difference in mean 
consumption) and “redistribution” (difference in inequality) components, and a residual. The 
fact that mean consumption is higher in the PSF data should lead to a decrease in poverty 
relative to ESPS, but the higher inequality plays in the opposite direction. Which of these 
components plays most is not a priori obvious. It happens that in our context, these two 
opposite biases happen to nearly exactly compensate each other. 
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3 INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITIES  
 
3.1 HOW IMPORTANT ARE INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITIES? 
Table 3 reports various measures of inequality, first on total consumption and then on food 
and non-food consumption separately. The top panel of the table shows inequality statistics 
based on per capita household consumption, while the bottom part displays those based on per 
capita cell consumption. 
As expected, the Gini index of inequality in the distribution of per capita household food 
expenditures is much lower than that of non-food spending, reaching 39.2% vs. 62.7%.  
 
Table 3: Inequality measures 
 Gini 90/10 75/25 Mean log 
dev 
Theil-T 
Per capita household consumption     
Total consumption 47.11 7.70 3.02 0.38 0.43 
 (1.06) (0.36) (0.13) (0.02) (0.03) 
Non-food consumption 62.72 19.48 5.23 0.77 0.82 
 (1.21) (1.10) (0.28) (0.03) (0.05) 
Food consumption 39.17 5.93 2.44 0.26 0.27 
 (0.71) (0.29) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) 
Per capita cell consumption      
Total consumption 49.67*** 8.72*** 3.12 0.42*** 0.50*** 
 (1.02) (0.42) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) 
Non-food consumption 67.16*** 26.39*** 5.91*** 0.92*** 1.00*** 
 (1.09) (1.54) (0.27) (0.03) (0.05) 
Food consumption 40.39*** 6.48***     2.54** 0.27*** 0.29*** 
 (0.69) (0.26) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Source: PSF survey, N=1762, authors’ calculations. Bootstrap standard errors (250 replications) between parentheses.  *,**,***: difference 
with per capita household consumption inequality measure is significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% level (see Note 12 and Appendix B for 
details). 
 
 
 
Using per capita cell consumption rather than per capita household consumption, inequality 
levels are revised upward.14 Most of the difference comes from the inequality of non-food 
                                                             
14 Standard errors in Table 3 cannot be used to assess the significance of the differences between inequality indices, 
since household and cell level indices are computed on the same sample. In order to account for the resulting 
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consumption, while inequality in food consumption is only mildly affected. The Gini of total 
consumption increases to nearly 50% when each individual is attributed their cell per capita 
consumption level (and that of non-food consumption to 67.2%). This level of inequality 
would place Senegal just below Honduras in the countries ranking, another 8 ranks hike from 
where the country stands when intra-household inequalities are not accounted for. 
How important are intra-household inequalities in the building of inter-personal inequalities? 
To answer this question we compute the Theil T index, which we decompose between intra- 
and inter-household inequalities (Table 4). The decomposition indicates that more than 18% 
of total inequalities in non-food expenditures occur within households. As expected, in the 
case of food expenditures the share of intra-household inequality is much lower, reaching 
only 6% of the total. 
Assuming equal sharing of food between household members eating together underestimates 
actual intra-household inequality in food consumption. In fact, although we cannot directly 
observe it,  there are some indications in the literature that in African contexts there exist 
intra-household inequalities in the access to nutritional inputs (see e.g. Dercon and Krishnan, 
2000, D’Souza and Tandon, forthcoming, or Brown et al., forthcoming).  
Table 4: Inequality decomposition 
 Theil T 
within 
Theil T 
between 
Share 
within 
All consumption 0.07 0.43 13.85 
 (0.01) (0.03) (1.34) 
Non-food consumption 0.18 0.82 17.78 
 (0.02) (0.05) (1.54) 
Food consumption 0.02 0.27 6.26 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.63) 
Source: PSF survey, N=1762 households. Bootstrap standard errors (250 replications) between 
parentheses. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
correlation between indices, standard errors of differences have been computed using 250 bootstrap replications. 
Results are presented in Appendix B, Table B1. Since all inequality indices used in this paper can be shown to be 
asymptotically normally distributed (see references in Appendix B), the usual t tests can be used to assess 
significance. 
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For total consumption, the share of intra-household inequality is nearly 14% of total 
inequality. Whether this is a large share or not is difficult to assess without a comparison 
point. We can think of one external comparison, that given by Klasen and Lahori (2016), who 
estimate intra-household inequality at about 30% of total inequality in India. This comparison 
is interesting, but not conclusive since these authors base their analysis on multidimensional 
poverty indices, not on consumption measures, so that the comparison cannot be done 
directly. Moreover, Klasen and Lahori estimates refer to India, a country that has an income 
per capita much greater than Senegal (1750US$ vs. 1042US$, in 2010 constant dollars, 
according to the World Development Indicators), leaving a larger margin for non-subsistence 
consumption expenditures that are likely to be more unequally shared than those expenditures 
dedicated to subsistence needs (unless the household is so poor that it has to engage into a 
lifeboat strategy, insuring enough resources to its income earning members – section 3.2. 
suggests this doesn’t apply in our context). 
To obtain a comparison point, it is possible to construct a counterfactual situation from our 
data that maximizes intra-household inequality. In order to do this, we simulated a distribution 
where everyone gets his observed share of food consumption and of consumption common to 
the household (such as electricity, water, furniture…). Note that this shared consumption 
amounts to 68% of total consumption on average. We then imagine an amazingly unfair 
household head capturing any extra resource and attribute all the remaining consumption to 
his/her cell, thereby maximizing intra-household inequality. When doing this, the Theil index 
of this distribution reaches 0.69, and the within-household component amounts to 0.23, that is 
33% of total consumption inequality. Gauging our result by this hypothetical counterfactual 
situation, it seems that the observed within-household inequality is very significant, reaching 
42% of this maximum. 
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3.2 THE CORRELATES OF INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITY 
Which households are more likely to be unequal? Is it related to the total amount of 
expenditure? To the household structure? To the head’s characteristics? In this section, we 
examine the correlates of being an unequal household focusing on the household structure, 
and show how the specificity of the PSF questionnaire allows to gain new insights on the 
determinants of intra-household inequality.  
In table 5, we present the correlates of the within household Theil index, both for 
consumption as a whole and then separately for food and non-food expenditures.  
Household structure clearly plays a role in explaining intra-household inequality. It is worth 
noting that this might be difficult to pin down with standard household surveys that only 
record the relationship of each household member to the household head. The first 2 columns 
of table 5 compare the description of the relation between inequality and household structure 
obtained from a regression using only variables that could be retrieved from a traditional 
survey, to what can be exhibited with the more detailed information on household structure 
that PSF contains. Column (1) describes household structure with variables counting the 
number of children below age 5, those between 5 and 15, the number of adult women between 
15 and 65 years of age, and the number of elderly members. It also includes a dummy variable 
if the household doesn’t embrace any horizontal extension, i.e. if all members are either the 
wife, the parents, the children or the grand-children of the household head. The first column 
only indicates that the level of intra household inequality increases with the number of 
children aged 5 to 14. As this might reflect difference in needs that are not captured by the per 
capita measure of individual consumption, it is not very revealing. The second column makes 
clear that, even controlling for the size and the age-gender composition of the household, its 
precise organisation matters. Extended households with more than two cells, whether they are 
polygamous households or include cells headed by relatives in addition to the head’s conjugal 
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unit, have more unequal resource allocation than any other household types. On the other 
hand, when the household head has no spouse in the household, resource allocation appears 
less unequal. 15  16   Note also that, even though there is very little inequality in food 
consumption that we can measure, households in which meals taken at home are not shared in 
by all members are significantly more unequal overall than those where everyone eats 
together. Interestingly, in addition to the fact that eating together mechanically reduces intra-
household inequality in food consumption, it is also correlated to lower inequality in non-food 
consumption, suggesting that taking all meals together is a symptom of a higher level of 
resource pooling. 17  Adding this variable doesn’t affect the correlation of the household 
structure variables with the within household inequality level. Results are reported in column 
(3).  
Finally, it appears that intra-household inequality increases with household total consumption, 
suggesting that it is not driven by lifeboat strategies.18  Further, it is worth noting that this 
result doesn’t support one of the key assumptions made in the literature on estimating 
individual shares of total spending from household aggregates (following Dunbar et al. 2013), 
backing up the idea that collective household models might not be well adapted to the context 
under study.  
When looking separately at food and non-food expenditures, the aggregate pattern appears 
very close to that of non-food consumption. In fact, hardly anything explains inequality in 
                                                             
15 83% of households headed by a head without a co-residing spouse are female headed.  
16 Whether the household head has ever been to formal school or not doesn’t appear to be correlated with the within–
household Theil in any of the specifications. The same holds for the polygamy of the household head. (Results not 
reported here). 
17 Systematic meal sharing is more frequent for the poorest households (see table E3, appendix E).  
18 Appendix E reports the results using deciles of per capita household consumption rather than log per capita 
household consumption, and the relationship with inequality seems rather linear.  
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food consumption, apart, in a rather mechanical way, from the observation made above that 
all household members take all their meals together 19 . Within household Theil of food 
expenditures is also lower for households with more adult women and for large households 
with more than 3 cells, none of them headed by a spouse of the head.  
In total, household structure (beyond and above its age-gender composition) and household 
living arrangements are strongly correlated with the observed intra-household inequality. 
  
                                                             
19 Without this variable, the R-square of the corresponding regression is 0.016, instead of  0.155.  
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Table 5: Correlates of Within household Inequality  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Theil T within Theil T within Theil T within Theil T within -
food 
Theil T within –
nonfood 
      
Dakar -0.0230* -0.0177 -0.0208* 0.00223 -0.107*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.00741) (0.0219) 
Other urban areas -0.0171 -0.00960 -0.0110 0.00395 -0.0668*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.00528) (0.0198) 
Log per cap. hh cons. 0.0379*** 0.0380*** 0.0369*** -0.00425 0.0533*** 
 (0.00860) (0.00862) (0.00844) (0.00283) (0.0116) 
Household size 0.00168 0.000615 0.000128 0.00141 -0.00237 
 (0.00186) (0.00181) (0.00171) (0.00150) (0.00315) 
Nb of cells in the hh  -0.00218 -0.000857 0.00353 0.00104 
  (0.00545) (0.00560) (0.00245) (0.0124) 
Nb of children 0-4 y.o 0.00512 0.00512 0.00439 -0.00127 0.0138** 
 (0.00320) (0.00329) (0.00326) (0.00271) (0.00659) 
Nb of children 5-14 y.o 0.00454* 0.00515* 0.00558** -0.00197 0.0165*** 
 (0.00270) (0.00268) (0.00266) (0.00190) (0.00583) 
Nb of women 15-65 y.o. -0.00391 -0.00337 -0.00422 -0.00492** -0.00322 
 (0.00301) (0.00310) (0.00316) (0.00202) (0.00608) 
Nb of elderly 66+ y.o 0.00626 0.00449 0.00412 -0.00126 9.53e-05 
 (0.00597) (0.00617) (0.00620) (0.00315) (0.0117) 
2-cell hh, head + other  -0.0219*** -0.0229*** -0.000136 -0.0791*** 
  (0.00748) (0.00756) (0.00575) (0.0152) 
3+-cell hh: head and 
wives. 
 0.0232** 0.0225** 0.00328 0.0644** 
  (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.00811) (0.0276) 
3+-cell hh: head, wife 
(wives), + other 
 0.0208* 0.0208* -0.00210 0.0308 
  (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.00417) (0.0219) 
3+-cell hh: head + others 
(no spouse) 
 -0.0159* -0.0217** -0.0186*** -0.0425** 
  (0.00853) (0.00913) (0.00560) (0.0198) 
HH without horizontal 
extensions 
0.00737     
 (0.00612)     
All meals taken together   -0.0538*** -0.0786*** -0.0395* 
   (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0202) 
Constant -0.432*** -0.423*** -0.360*** 0.125*** -0.440*** 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.0997) (0.0421) (0.141) 
      
Observations 1,426 1,426 1,426 1,426 1,426 
R-squared 0.067 0.080 0.109 0.155 0.105 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. N=1426 households with at least two cells. OLS regressions. Additional 
controls: religion and ethnicity of the household head. Reference category for household structure is a household with 
two cells: head and spouse. “2-cell hh: head + other” refers to households composed of 2 cells, where the second cell 
is not that of the head’s spouse. “3+-cell hh: head and wives” refers to polygamous households, where all the cells are 
headed by members of the conjugal unit. “3+-cell hh: head, wife (wives) + other” refers to households with at least 3 
cells and where at least one of the cells is not headed by a spouse of the head. “3+-cell hh: head+others (no wife)” 
refers to households with more than 3 cells and where none of them is headed by a spouse of the household head.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4 IMPACT ON POVERTY DIAGNOSTIC 
 
4.1 DO INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITIES MODIFY THE EXTENT OF 
POVERTY? 
Computing poverty estimates using per adult equivalent cell rather than household 
consumption allows factoring in intra-household inequality. How does it impact poverty? As 
shown in table 6, using per adult equivalent cell rather than household consumption leads to 
revise poverty levels upwards, both for the headcount and the poverty gap. 
The results show that the household level approach leads to an underestimation of poverty 
rates by 0.3 to 3.6 percentage points, depending on the poverty line and the residential area. 
This corresponds to an underestimation of the prevalence of poverty by 8.2% (basic needs 
threshold) and 9.3% (nutrition threshold) at the national level. The underestimation is 
particularly severe in Dakar (14% for the basic needs threshold), as could have been expected, 
given the especially high intra-household inequality in that area. 
Table 6: Poverty estimates 
 Nutrition poverty line Basic needs poverty line 
 Headcount Poverty gap  Headcount Poverty gap  
 Index Index Index index 
Per adult equivalent 
household consumption 
    
     
National 16.69 4.24 42.78 14.26 
 (1.11) (0.38) (1.33) (0.64) 
Dakar 1.78 0.32 25.57 6.31 
 (0.80) (0.13) (2.37) (0.67) 
Other urban 9.16 1.98 33.69 9.99 
 (2.05) (0.58) (2.93) (1.19) 
Rural 29.81 7.81 58.09 21.36 
 (2.04) (0.71) (2.12) (1.02) 
Per adult equivalent cell 
consumption 
    
     
National 18.24*** 5.12*** 46.29*** 16.04*** 
 (1.00) (0.37) (1.26) (0.64) 
Dakar 2.07 0.47*** 29.14*** 7.94*** 
 (0.61) (0.17) (2.02) (0.70) 
Other urban 11.23** 2.93*** 37.12*** 11.61*** 
 (1.95) (0.66) (2.53) (1.11) 
Rural 32.00*** 9.15*** 61.60*** 23.31*** 
 (1.87) (0.70) (1.82) (0.99) 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. Sample sizes are 1762 households and 4293 cells. Bootstrap standard errors (250 
replications) between parentheses. Equivalent scale: 0.5: children 0 to 14 years old; 1: adults. *,**,***: difference with per adult eq. 
household consumption poverty measure is significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level (see Note 12 and Appendix B for details). 
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As seen in Table 6, the difference in poverty measures based on per adult equivalent 
household or cell consumption depends on the choice of poverty line. In appendix D we 
assess the sensitivity of the results to this choice. We find that the difference between poverty 
rates is significant for a large range of poverty lines.  
 
4.2 BEING POOR AMONG THE NON-POOR. 
The evidence of intra-household inequality raises the possibility that some poor individuals 
might go unnoticed because they live in households where not everyone is poor and that may 
not be identified as poor by poverty measures based on standard assessments of consumption 
levels. In fact, poor cells can be found within non-poor households and, inversely, non-poor 
cells within poor households.20 This is documented in figure 1 and table 7. In figure 1 we plot 
the ranking of cells depending on whether one uses household or cell level per adult 
equivalent consumption for the first two quartiles of the distribution. The vertical and 
horizontal lines in the graphic shows the rank of the cell that is just at the nutrition (left panel, 
first quartile) or basic need threshold (right panel, second quartile). The figure shows that 
there is a substantial reordering of cells depending on how consumption is measured. This has 
implications on the identification of the poor, with all cells located in the top left and in the 
bottom right parts of both panels being misclassified, when using household level 
consumption, as being either non poor, while being poor (top left) or poor while being non 
poor (bottom right). Table 7 ventilates the distribution of households in 4 categories according 
to the poverty status of the household and the presence or not of cells with a different poverty 
status (columns 1 and 2). The distribution of cells and individuals according to their poverty 
status and that of their household is given in columns 3 to 6. We observe that the proportion 
                                                             
20 See Brown et al., (forthcoming) for similar findings based on nutrition. 
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of poor cells belonging to a non-poor household varies between 2.6% and 5.1% of cells 
depending on the poverty threshold (4th column). Comparing with the population percentages 
(6th column), we observe that poor cells in non-poor households seem to be large cells. 
 
 
In total, using the basic needs poverty threshold, 13.7%21 of non-poor households include at 
least one poor cell, which means that 10.8% of the members of non-poor households are, in 
fact, poor, or that 13.4% of the poor live in non-poor households. This suggests that 
measuring poverty using a well-being measure computed at the household level can lead to  
an underestimation of the extent of poverty, but more importantly, to serious miss-
identification of the poor.  
 
                                                             
21 158/(158+996) from Column 1. 
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Source: PSF survey, authors' calculations. N=1070 (first quartile) and 1072 cells (second quartile). For each 
graph, horizontal axis shows the ranking of cells based on cell level consumption aggregate, while vertical axis 
shows the ranking based on household level consumption aggregate.
Equivalence scale: 1 for adults, 0.5 for children less than 15.
Figure 1
First two quartiles
Reordering of cells depending on consumption measurement
level by quartile of p.a.e. household consumption
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Table 7: Distribution of the poor by Poverty Status of their household 
 Households Cells Individuals 
 N % N % N % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic needs threshold       
Poor in non-poor households 158 8.97 219 5.10 865 6.18 
Poor in poor households 446 25.31 1,514 35.27 5,610 40.11 
Non-poor in poor households 162 9.19 181 4.22 374 2.67 
Non-poor in non-poor households 996 56.53 2,379 55.42 7,139 51.04 
Nutrition threshold       
Poor in non-poor households 79 4.48 110 2.56 419 3.00 
Poor in poor households 136 7.72 556 12.95 2,133 15.25 
Non-poor in poor households 84 4.77 100 2.33 201 1.44 
Non-poor in non-poor households 1,463 83.03 3,527 82.16 11,235 80.32 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. Poverty status based on per adult equivalent consumption. Equivalent scale: 0.5: children 
0 to 14 years old; 1: adults.  
Reading note:  The line “poor in non-poor households” gives the number (and share) of non-poor households containing at least 
one poor cell; then, the number of poor cells found in non-poor households; and finally, the number of poor individuals found in 
non-poor households. Following lines are to be read in a similar way. The second line gives numbers for poor households where 
everyone is poor, the third line for poor households containing at least one non-poor cell, and the fourth line for non-poor 
households where all the cells are non-poor. 
 
In non-poor households that include at least one poor cell, investigating who is particularly at 
risk of being poor could be of first order policy relevance. A simple logit estimate of the 
probability for non-poor households of comprising at least one poor cell shows unsurprisingly 
that richer households are less likely to be in this case, and, controlling for household per 
adult equivalent consumption, complex households, in urban areas, whose head has no formal 
schooling are more likely to have some poor members. This is mitigated if they take together 
all the meals eaten at home (see table E2 in appendix). An analysis of the probability of being 
the head of a poor cell in a non-poor household, taking household fixed-effect into account 
(conditional logit) is presented in Table 8. Column 1 shows that large cells, those headed by 
the wife of the head and with many young children, are more likely to be in this situation. 
Some of it might be driven by differences in needs not properly accounted for by the 
equivalence scales. Generally, the cell of the household head is the least likely to be a poor 
cell in a non-poor household. More interesting is the fact that cells headed by distant family 
members are more vulnerable. Most of those factors are particularly important for household 
whose consumption places them in the bottom quintile of the distribution of non-poor 
household (column 3). In richer households (in the top 4 quintiles – column 2), apart from 
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female headed cells, those at risk of poverty are only those headed by a distant relative of the 
household head.   
Table 8: Probability of being a poor cell in a non-poor household (household fixed 
effects). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES _All _80% richest 
hh – non-poor 
20% poorest 
hh – non-poor 
    
Cell head is a woman 1.860* 2.475** 1.226 
 (0.658) (1.035) (0.915) 
Age of cell head 1.032** 1.021 1.061* 
 (0.0147) (0.0172) (0.0342) 
Cell size 1.174* 1.135 1.508* 
 (0.105) (0.116) (0.342) 
Nb of children 0 - 4 y.o. in cell 1.640** 1.536* 1.462 
 (0.325) (0.380) (0.566) 
Nb of children 5 - 14 y.o. in cell 0.981 0.967 0.826 
 (0.144) (0.165) (0.279) 
Cell head is a child of hh head 2.114 1.484 6.139 
 (1.134) (1.008) (7.006) 
Cell head is parent or grand-parent of hh head 0.964 1.079 1.051 
 (0.726) (0.893) (1.885) 
Cell head is a sibling of hh head 2.341 2.017 2.229 
 (1.323) (1.262) (2.884) 
Cell head other family link to hh head 2.830** 2.382* 3.505 
 (1.231) (1.220) (3.475) 
Cell head is the spouse of hh head 2.134* 1.656 4.328* 
 (0.843) (0.777) (3.619) 
Cell head is literate 0.864 0.939 0.857 
 (0.302) (0.396) (0.545) 
Cell head has no formal schooling 1.447 1.114 5.132* 
 (0.548) (0.498) (4.693) 
    
Observations 501 338 163 
Pseudo-R2 0.23 0.22 0.34 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. Conditional logit estimates (household fixed effects).Odds 
ratioreported. Coeff. standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1..Cell head’s relation to 
the household head reference category: cell head is the household head. 
 
4.3 ARE THE POOR IN NON-POOR HOUSEHOLDS AS POOR? 
How poor are the poor that live in non-poor households? A natural question is that of whether 
the intensity of poverty is lower for them than for those who live in households where 
everyone is poor. Table 9 gives some elements to answer this question by presenting the 
poverty gap for the poor who live in non-poor households (Columns c1 and c2) and 
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comparing it to that of the poor from homogeneously poor households (a1 and a2), and from 
poor households with non-poor members (b1 and b2). 
 
Table 9: Poverty gaps for poor cells in poor and non-poor households 
 Nutrition poverty threshold Basic needs poverty threshold 
 (a1) (b1) (c1) (a2) (b2) (c2) 
National 32.22 28.15 14.39 40.50 30.48 14.17 
 (1.66) (1.93) (2.08) (1.00) (1.38) (0.84) 
Dakar 29.98 30.14 9.62 31.13 26.84 17.96 
 (10.07) (5.97) (3.25) (2.02) (2.09) (1.71) 
Other urban areas 28.88 29.80 17.04 37.00 32.07 10.53 
 (3.11) (6.63) (3.68) (2.55) (3.78) (2.07) 
Rural areas 32.61 27.75 14.19 43.48 31.31 13.13 
 (1.75) (1.96) (2.69) (1.14) (1.77) (1.24) 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. Poverty status based on per adult equivalent consumption. Bootstrap standard 
errors are between parentheses (250 replications). Equivalent scale: 0.5: children 0 to 14 years old; 1: adults. Columns 
(a1) and (a2) show the value of the poverty gap for poor cells in poor households in which all cells are found poor; 
columns (b1) and (b2) show the value of the poverty gap for poor cells in poor households, in which some cells are found 
not poor; and columns (c1) and (c2) show the value of the poverty gap for poor cells in non-poor households. 
 
 
Table 9 clearly shows that the poor in non-poor households are less poor than other poor. At 
the national level, the poverty gap for this group is only half that of the poor who live in poor 
households that contain non-poor members. At the basic needs threshold, it reaches only 35% 
of the poverty gap of the poor in poor households. This is understandable, as intra-household 
inequality is more likely to push part of the household members on the other side of the 
poverty line if the household as a whole is not too far from it. It suggests that the “invisible 
poor” are likely to be among the least poor of the poor. 
 
5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
5.1 SENSITIVITY TO MEASUREMENT ERROR 
We assess the robustness of the above estimates to various amounts of measurement error, as 
inequality measures can be particularly sensitive to this source of bias. Following Chesher and 
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Schluter (2002), we first produce overall inequality estimates correcting for some amount of 
measurement error. Assuming an error to signal variances ratio of 10% (resp. 20%) would 
decrease the estimated Gini from 47.1 to 45.3% (resp. 43.6%) and the Theil-T from 42.8 to 
39.5 (resp. 36.1).22 The assumed variance of measurement error needs to reach 40% of that of 
the signal for the Gini to go down to a level comparable to the uncorrected published statistics 
(40 instead of a published 40.3). Such level of measurement error is highly unlikely. Bound et 
al., 2001, give much lower orders of magnitude for measurement error in income, closer to 
20%, and this is the range considered by Chesher and Schluter, 2002 in their application to 
Indonesian data. Hence, it is unlikely that measurement error explains the high observed 
inequality in the PSF survey. In addition, given ESPS data is as likely to be error-ridden as 
PSF, measurement errors certainly cannot account for the difference in the inequality 
estimates. 
In the case of the PSF survey, because consumption data are collected at the cell level, 
measurement error will take place at that level. In such a case, working at the household level 
would help to average out some of this noise, while it would be maximal when working at the 
cell level. That would suffice to induce some intra-household inequality even if the true 
distribution is egalitarian. Although we already know, thanks to the analysis of section 3.2, 
that this within-household inequality is not pure noise, as it correlates with a number of 
observable characteristics of the households, it is important to evaluate the sensitivity of our 
estimates to measurement error at the cell level. We will again resort to simulations. 
Assuming measurement error takes the form of a white noise, the idea is to assess how large it 
should be to explain the whole of the observed share of intra-household inequality.  
                                                             
22 Error to signal variances ratio is given by 𝜈 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)
𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)
, where Z is the error contaminated measure of consumption 
and X the error-free measure of consumption. 
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Appendix F details the procedure. To summarize, under the assumption that there is no intra-
household inequality, but that cell consumption is measured with error, we simulate the 
observed distribution of per capita cell consumption, varying the magnitude of measurement 
error as a proportion of the variance of the original distribution of log consumption. We then 
assess the level of error that is needed to reproduce the observed amount of intra-household 
inequality. Results are shown in appendix table F.1. It appears that it requires an error term 
with a variance fixed at 70% of the variance of the original distribution of log-consumption 
for the decomposition of the Theil index to indicate a within-household share of total 
inequality of 14%. At 40%, the Gini index for the distribution of per capita cell consumption 
is 2.75% higher than the one for the per capita household consumption, as we actually observe 
in our data (2.56%). In both cases, such levels of measurement error are unrealistically large 
compared to the 20% benchmark mentioned above, so that we are confident measurement 
error is not the only force driving our results.   
5.2 OTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Individual consumption can be measured per capita or per adult equivalent. The use of per 
capita consumption to assess the extent of inequality is likely to yield a higher level of 
inequality than the use of per adult equivalent consumption, if there is a positive correlation 
between the risk of poverty and the number of children in a household. This is true between 
households, and also within households and between cells, if poor cells have more children 
than non-poor ones. Hence, using an equivalence scale may provide a different picture on 
inequality. In Appendix Table C1, we compute the same inequality measures as those 
presented in Table 2, this time based on consumption per adult equivalent, where a weight of 
1 is given to adults, and children between 0 and 14 are weighted 0.5. As can be seen from this 
table, the difference with per capita estimates is in line with what was expected: inequality 
based on per adult equivalent consumption is indeed found lower. But the difference is not 
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very high, and the gap between household and cell consumption estimates remains of the 
same order of magnitude as that of Table 2. As for intra-household inequality, appendix Table 
C2 shows the inequality decomposition obtained when using per adult equivalent 
consumption with three different equivalence scales: Scale A is the same as that employed in 
Table C1, while Scale B puts a reduced weight on very young children (0.2 for children less 
than age 4). Scale C applies different weights depending on the kind of commodities. For 
food, weights are chosen in order to hold account of estimated caloric needs for moderately 
active people, depending on age and gender, and based on tables provided by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.23 Results are hardly impacted by the reduced 
weight given to children: intra-household inequality still accounts for about 13% of the total 
(or 43% of the maximal intra-household inequality simulated taking these equivalence scales 
into account). Finally, so as to ensure that the results are not driven by education 
expenditures, an important child specific spending unevenly distributed in the population, we 
replicate the exercise on consumption aggregates net of education expenditures (school fees, 
furniture, and transportation). Results are shown in the bottom part of Appendix Table C2. 
They are not significantly altered.24 
Poverty measures are likely to be more sensitive to the choice of equivalence scale, if the risk 
of poverty depends on household or cell size. In table C3 we repeat the same exercise as in 
table C2 this time for FGT indices. As we can see the estimated poverty rates are a bit higher 
when scale C is used due to the higher weight given to children between 5 and 14 in the 
equivalence scale for food consumption, but the gap between FGT indices based on per adult 
equivalent cell and household consumption persists. 
                                                             
23 https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/2015/guidelines/appendix-2/ 
24 Note that health expenditures are not included in the consumption aggregate we are using.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper uses a novel survey designed to measure intra-household consumption inequalities. 
Gaining a thorough understanding of these issues is all the more crucial that a number of new 
redistributive public policies are developed today, such as the Programme National de 
Bourses de Sécurité Familiale, PNBSF, a large conditional cash transfer scheme meant as the 
stepping stone of a broader social safety net. Whether and how the choice of the beneficiary 
within the household matters is a central question for the design of such program.  
This new survey allows us not only to reevaluate the level of inter-personal inequality in 
Senegal and to reveal the extent of intra-household inequality, but also to analyze how this 
leads to a reassessment of the poverty diagnostic for the country. 
The consumption survey we designed innovates by collecting information at the level of sub-
groups within the household, using different respondents for different household cells. A first 
consequence of this approach is that it allowed us to collect more complete consumption data. 
Total consumption is measured to be higher than what was obtained with a classical 
consumption survey at the same period, as well as more unequally distributed. This could 
have an a priori ambiguous impact on global poverty assessment, since the two effects--one 
on the mean and one on inequality--should impact poverty estimates in opposite directions. In 
the context studied here, these two contrary effects seem to compensate each other so that the 
overall bias is rather small. Now, inequality is shown to be much higher than what was 
previously thought, with a Gini coefficient reaching 47.1%, while international statistical 
yearbooks give a Gini of 40.3. 
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Our results suggest that the more complex the household structure, the bigger the household 
size, and the more inequality is likely to be underestimated when computed using standard 
consumption surveys. This would imply that cross-country comparisons of inequality levels 
should take into account these differences in family structure and organisation. 
Within-household inequality accounts for nearly 14% of inter-personal inequality in Senegal, 
which we evaluate to be 42% of the level that would be reached if household heads captured 
the entire private consumption in households. One of the consequences of such unequal 
repartition of resources within households is the potential existence of “invisible poor” in 
households classified as non-poor. Taking intra-household unequal access to resources into 
account, we assess that as many as 13.4% of the poor individuals live in non-poor households. 
They are therefore ignored when the poverty status of the household is supposed to apply 
uniformly to all household members. This could have important consequences for the 
effectiveness of anti-poverty policies. 
When households are large and of a complex structure, as in Senegal and in many sub-
Saharan African countries, where several somewhat autonomous budgetary units cohabit, it is 
not the case that everyone has access to the same level of resources. In these contexts, coming 
as close as possible to the individual when measuring welfare is crucial in order to obtain 
adequate measures of poverty and help anti-poverty policies to efficiently target the poor.  
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Appendix A: ESPS/PSF comparison 
1. Questionnaire design 
The PSF and ESPS surveys differ in their way of measuring consumption by several aspects. PSF 
innovates in the fact that the consumption questionnaire is addressed to all household members that 
potentially have a say about resources allocation (the so-called “cell heads”), as opposed to the usual 
practice in which only one member (commonly the household head) is sought to answer that part of 
the questionnaire. In doing so, and since the head may not be informed of the consumption of all 
members, the PSF survey should capture more consumption than regular surveys, particularly in large 
extended households where several adults may have their own income sources. However, there are 
other variations in the questionnaires that may explain eventual discrepancies in the level of 
consumption captured by the two surveys: the degree of commodity detail and the length of the 
reference period are two obvious differences that have been investigated in the literature (see Beegle et 
al. 2012 for a survey). It seems common sense to assume that the higher the number of items over 
which consumption is collected, the larger should be the total level of consumption in the household. 
However the gain in coverage warranted by a longer list of items may come at the cost of a loss in 
reporting precision, due to household or surveyor fatigue resulting from an exceedingly long 
questionnaire. Nevertheless, there is a large consensus in the literature on the fact that a short list of 
commodity items results in a less precise and lower aggregate consumption level. Conclusions 
concerning the recall period are less clear cut. On the one hand long recall periods may be better able 
to capture the consumption of commodities that are not frequently bought over the year and limit the 
risk of “telescoping” errors, in which respondent include consumptions just outside the reference 
period. On the other hand, the longer the recall period, the more are respondent likely to under-report 
consumption due to recollection difficulties. Evidence concerning the impact of the reference period 
length is mixed, with some papers invoking a too short report period to explain a level of consumption 
lower than expected (Lanjouw 2005 for food consumption in Brazil) and other showing that the level 
of daily consumption expenditure decreases with the number of days of recall (Scott and Amenuvegbe 
1990 for Ghana), while Deaton and Grosh (2000) using data from LSMS surveys conducted in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Vietnam and Pakistan conclude that measured consumption does not depend much on the 
recall period length. Based on experimental data from Tanzania, Beegle et al. (2012) compare eight 
different questionnaire designs. They find that the “usual” consumption approach in which the 
household is asked to report the level of consumption over a regular month and the number of months 
of consumption, yields rather unprecise results when compared to a 7 days record period: food 
consumption is underestimated and non-food consumption overestimated. They attribute these 
discrepancies to the high cognitive demand of the usual food questions which require the respondent 
to make an estimation of their consumption rather than just to recall and count what has been 
consumed over a given period. They advocate that the 7 days recall period may get closer to the true 
consumption level, though it may perform poorly in households with a large number of adults. 
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Table A1.1 : Comparison of ESPS and PSF surveys designs 
 ESPS PSF 
Respondent Number and list of items Recall period Respondent Number and list of items Recall period 
Purchased food 
(every day 
spending) 
   Household 
members in 
charge of 
preparing 
meals 
Respondent is asked about 
the amount of every day 
spending (“dépense 
quotidienne”, DQ), she/he 
receives from contributors.  
Respondent is 
asked about the 
length of the 
period covered by 
the DQ (from one 
day to three 
months). 
Every day spending is not separately covered. 
   
Food 
contributions 
received in kind 
   Household 
head 
Respondent is asked about 
the amount of the 
contributions received by 
the household on a regular 
basis. 
 
Frequency is 
reported by the 
respondent who 
can choose among 
twelve modalities 
from every day to 
every year. 
Respondent is 
asked about the 
usual 
contributions. 
 
Contributions received in 
kind are not covered. 
 
   
Other purchased 
food 
Household 
head 
Respondent is asked about 
expenditure on 27 items: 
Millet, maize, sorghum and 
fonio; Sub-products from 
millet, maize and sorghum; 
Rice; Peanuts and their 
subproducts; Vegetable 
(olive, cotton, sesame) and 
peanut oil; Other oils 
Over the 30 last 
days. The 
respondent is then 
asked about the 
number of times it 
spent the same 
amount over the 
12 last months.  
Household 
head 
The head of household is 
asked about items that 
he/she is in charge of 
buying him/herself (this 
does not necessarily means 
that he/she pays for it and 
the act of purchasing may 
be delegated). A total of 25 
food items are 
Frequency is 
reported by the 
respondent who 
can choose among 
twelve modalities 
from every day to 
every year. 
Respondent is 
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 ESPS PSF 
Respondent Number and list of items Recall period Respondent Number and list of items Recall period 
(palm,…); Tomato 
concentrate; Fresh 
tomatoes; Vegetables and 
tubers; Condiments and 
seasonings; Fresh fish; 
Smoked and dried fish; Red 
meat; Poultry; Sugar; 
Coffee; Tea; Cola; Non-
alcoholic beverages (water, 
coke, sprite…); Local fruit 
juices; Alcoholic beverages; 
Bread (wheat, millet); 
Cakes and cookies; Milk 
(fresh and concentrate); 
Other dairy products; 
Fruits; Meals and other 
foods consumed outside. 
distinguished: Breads; Rice; 
Millet and sorghum; Other 
cereals; Oils; Fish; Meat; 
Vegetables; Fruits; Sugar; 
Potatoes; Cassava; Other 
tubers; Milk; Butter; Eggs; 
Salt; Coffee; Tea; Drinks; 
Other food products; 
Prepared meals; Food 
consumed outside; 
Beverages consumed 
outside; Meals taken 
outside; 
 
asked about the 
usual 
expenditure.   
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 ESPS PSF 
Respondent Number and list of items Recall period Respondent Number and list of items Recall period 
Home produced 
food 
Household 
head 
3 categories: Agricultural 
products; Livestock 
products; Fishing products. 
Over the 12 last 
months. 
Household 
head 
3 categories: Agricultural 
products; Livestock 
products; Fishing products. 
Over the last 12 
months. 
For each item 
they produce, 
hunt, fish or 
gather: 
Respondent  
asked how many 
months in the 
year it is 
consumed and the 
monthly market 
value  
Utilities Household 
head 
3 items: Water; Electricity; 
Telephone (fixed and 
mobile). 
Over the two last 
months. 
Household 
and cell 
heads 
4 items: Water; Electricity; 
Fixed telephone; Mobile 
phone. 
Frequency is 
reported by the 
respondent who 
can choose among 
twelve modalities 
from every day to 
every year. 
Respondent is 
asked about both 
usual expenditure 
and last 
Housing fuels 
and combustible 
materials 
Household 
head 
4 items: Gas; Charcoal; 
Wood; Combustible 
materials (candles and 
petroleum). 
Over the last 30 
days (and if not 
purchased, amount 
usually spent over 
a month). 
Household 
and cell 
heads 
1 item: Fuels and 
combustible materials 
(wood, charcoal, gas, 
candles and petroleum);  
Durable goods Household 
head 
3 items: Furniture and 
electrical appliances; 
Transport means (car, 
Over the last 12 
months 
Household 
and cell 
heads 
2 items: Furniture and 
electrical appliances; 
Transport means (car, 
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 ESPS PSF 
Respondent Number and list of items Recall period Respondent Number and list of items Recall period 
motorcycle, bicycle…); 
Jewelries.25 
motorcycle, bicycle…) expenditure.  
Other non-
personal items 
Household 
head 
6 items: Soap and housing 
cleaning products; Maid; 
Housing maintenance and 
repair; Small appliances 
and cutlery; Motor fuels, 
repair of transport means; 
Other expenses. 
Over the last 30 
days (and if not 
purchased, amount 
usually spent over 
a month). 
Household 
and cell 
heads 
7 items: Maid; Housing 
maintenance and repair; 
Furniture and electrical 
appliances repair; Small 
appliances and cutlery; 
Motor fuels, repair of 
transport means; 
Recreational devices and 
accessories; Other goods 
and services. 
Education Household 
head 
5 items: School fees; Books 
and school supplies; School 
transportation; School 
uniform; Other expenses. 
Over the last 
school year 
Cell heads 5 items: School fees; Books 
and school supplies; School 
transportation; Private 
lessons; Vocational training. 
Frequency is 
reported by the 
respondent who 
can choose among 
twelve modalities 
from every day to 
every year. 
Respondent is 
asked about both 
usual expenditure 
and last 
expenditure.  
Personal items Household 
head 
8 items: Soaps; Perfumes 
and cosmetics; Tobacco 
and cigarettes; 
Recreational services, 
books and newspapers; 
Clothing; Shoes; Cloth; 
Tailoring. 
Over the last 30 
days (and if not 
purchased, amount 
usually spent over 
a month). 
Cell heads 6 items: Transport; Clothing 
and shoes; Personal care 
(soaps, perfumes and 
cosmetics, tobacco and 
cigarettes etc.); Personal 
belongings (jewelries etc.); 
Recreational services; 
Books and newspapers. 
 
                                                             
25 In the PSF survey, jewelry expenditures are covered in the personal item section of the questionnaire. 
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In table A1.1 we report the main features of the ESPS and PSF consumption questionnaires. In both 
surveys the list of commodities is restricted to what has been included in the consumption 
aggregates computed for this paper. The PSF survey sample is small compared to that of the ESPS 
(1762 households versus 13559). For this reason, and since in Senegal the large majority of 
households are owners of their housing (more than 80% at the time of the survey, and more than 
97% in rural areas), the PSF survey does not allow to compute imputed rents for owners in rural 
areas. Therefore, we decided not to include housing rents in our expenditure aggregates. Also 
excluded are income and direct taxes, together with gifts, construction, celebration that are not 
completely covered in PSF. We also exclude health expenditures, since we wish to exclude them 
from the analysis as interpersonal differences are likely to largely correspond to difference in 
needs. The PSF and ESPS surveys do not differ much in the level of disaggregation of the 
commodities included by the consumption questionnaire: 30 food and 29 non-food items are 
covered by ESPS, versus 28 food and 25 non-food in PSF. There are two major differences in the 
way food expenses are collected. First, while in ESPS the design of the food consumption 
questionnaire does not differ from that of non-food, in PSF the food section is first addressed to 
household members in charge of preparing meals. The respondents are asked about the amount of 
the daily expenditure (“dépense quotidienne”, DQ) that is spent for these meals. Field interviews 
that have been conducted before the survey showed that the DQ mainly covers expenses for fresh 
food, such as vegetables, fruits, fish and meat. Other food commodities, such as rice or oil for 
instance, are often bought directly by the head of the household, generally in bulks. The second 
part of the questionnaire covers these expenses. Later, cell heads are also asked to report any 
expenditure related to food and meals consumed outside the household by members of their cell. In 
ESPS, this question is addressed only to the household head. The second important difference lies 
in the fact that the PSF questionnaire records the amount of contributions in kind received by the 
head of the household. This is an important feature since about 20% of the households declare they 
receive such contributions. 
The second important difference between ESPS and PSF designs is that while ESPS varies the 
length of recall with the type of commodities, PSF gives the respondent the choice of the reference 
period. 
Finally, it should also be mentioned that, aside the consumption survey, the PSF questionnaire is 
much longer than that of ESPS. Since consumption is covered after the individual surveys, the 
quality of the consumption data in PSF may be negatively impacted in large households due to 
respondent and surveyor fatigue. Note, nonetheless, that the extra length of the questionnaire is 
somewhat compensated in terms of fatigue in PSF by the fact that the burden of the survey is 
shared among all cell heads. 
2. Implications for consumption measurement  
Overall, it is difficult to assess how these differences between designs may impact the 
measurement of consumption. As mentioned, interviewing several adult members of the household 
is likely to allow PSF to reduce mismeasurement due to asymmetric information within the 
household. Food consumption may also be better captured in PSF, since respondent in charge of 
preparing meals and of buying food on markets generally know precisely how much they spend 
every day, or every week, and this amount is unlikely to change much on a short period of time. On 
the contrary, household and surveyor fatigue, being potentially more likely to happen in PSF may 
impact negatively the measurement of consumption. As for variations in the length of the reference 
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period it is difficult to anticipate how they correlate with any discrepancy between ESPS and PSF 
total household consumption aggregates. 
Nevertheless, two conjectures can be made. First, if the PSF design is better able to apprehend food 
consumption than that of ESPS and if household or surveyor fatigue does not impact too much the 
ability to capture consumption of food commodities, then one can expect to find a higher level of 
food consumption in the PSF survey. Moreover, since in more than 80% of households all 
members take their meals together, the gap between surveys should not depend on the household 
structure. Second, for total household consumption, one cannot conjecture whether any difference 
should be observed on average between surveys, but we may expect the ratio of PSF to ESPS 
household consumption for a given household type to increase with the complexity of the 
household structure. 
Testing these conjectures is not straightforward. Contrary to PSF, the ESPS survey has not been 
designed to capture the entire complexity of Senegalese households. One can only rely on the usual 
“relationship to head” question to recover, in as much as possible, the household structure and 
identify the number of budget decision units. The basic strategy is to count the number of 
household members of the different types, as defined by their relationship to the head: spouse, 
child, grand-child, parent, grand-parent, brother/sister, nephew/niece, other parent, unrelated etc. 
and then to compare that number to the household size. For instance, a simple two cell household 
can be constituted of a male head, his (unique) spouse and his children. The children can be those 
of the spouse, in which case they belong to her cell, or they can be born from another marriage, in 
which case they belong to the head’s cell. In any case, households with the head, one spouse and 
children and with no other members are two cell households. The difficulty is that these nuclear 
families are not the only kind of two cell households, but they are the only ones that ESPS can 
identify for sure. For instance, consider a household in which on top of the household head, his 
spouse and their children, one also finds the head’s sister and his niece. This could be a two cells or 
a three cells household, depending on the relationship between these two extra members. If the 
niece of the household head is also the daughter of his sister, then the two constitute a third cell, 
while if they are not related, both will be in the head’s cell. To sum up, we are able to identify four 
kinds of households in the ESPS sample (and of course also in the PSF): (1) single person 
households, (2) one cell households, (3) more than one cell households with only “nuclear” family 
members and their offspring (head, spouse(s), children, grand-children), (4) other households. For 
reasons just explained, some truly one cell households may be misclassified as “other” households, 
but the opposite cannot happen. 
We apply this classification rule to both the PSF and ESPS samples and compare the estimated 
average household per capita food and total consumption for each category of households and for 
the entire samples. In order to make meaningful comparisons, we need to account for any sampling 
frame variation and for the fact that about one year separates the ESPS and PSF surveys. Simple 
unweighted comparison of surveyed household locations shows that PSF oversampled the Dakar 
region compared to ESPS (37.5% in PSF versus 11.8% in ESPS). Since households in Dakar are on 
average wealthier than those in other regions of the country, a simple comparison of average 
consumption levels is unlikely to reflect solely differences in survey design. Using the survey 
weights helps to correct imbalances but not completely. The weighted proportion of households in 
Dakar is still 3% higher in PSF than in ESPS (29.5% for PSF versus 26.6% for ESPS) and very 
large imbalances appear between the Matam (PSF: 12.8%; ESPS: 3.4%) and Thies (PSF: 6.4%; 
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ESPS: 14.2%) regions. In the face of this, we decided to follow a strategy initiated by DiNardo, 
Fortin and Lemieux (1996)26. Pooling together the PSF and ESPS data, we estimated a logit model 
on the probability of being in the PSF sample, using region and urbanization dummies as 
explanatory variables, since these variables have been used to stratify the sampling frame. 
Estimation results are then used to compute the predicted probability of belonging to the PSF 
sample, ps. Then ESPS observations are reweighted using ps/(1-ps) as weights. This strategy gives 
much better results in that all strong imbalances between samples are corrected, with the maximum 
difference between the two surveys in the proportion of households living in a given region being 
lower than 0.5%. We also hold account of the general progression of prices between the two 
surveys, using figures provided by the Senegalese statistical agency (ANSD). PSF has been 
conducted between November 2006 and April 2007, almost exactly a year after ESPS. In order to 
estimate the average change of the price index between these two periods, we computed the mean 
of the annual inflation rates calculated over the 6 twelve-month periods going from November 
2005 to November 2006, December 2005 to December 2006, January 2006 to January 2007, 
February 2006 to February 2007, March 2006 to March 2007, and April 2006 to April 2007. For 
total consumption, this leads to an average one year inflation rate of 4.7%. ESPS figures have been 
adjusted accordingly.27,28 
Tables A2.1 and A2.2 show the estimated levels of average aggregate food and total household 
consumption per capita for all four categories of households and for the entire sample. The pattern 
is clear and consistent with our intuitions. In table A2.1, the results show no apparent relationship 
between household complexity and the difference between the two surveys estimates. However, as 
we conjectured, the amount of measured food consumption is always found higher in PSF, though 
the difference is not always significant. Table A2.2 shows the same exercise, but this time for total 
consumption. For single person households we find a higher level of annual expenditure in favour 
of PSF, but the difference is not significant. For other kinds of households, as expected we see a 
clear increase in the difference between estimated average aggregate levels of consumption per 
capita when moving from one cell households (with a negative nonsignificant difference) to 
“other” complex households, for which PSF expenditure per capita are significantly higher than 
ESPS. The last line of the table shows the values of expenditure per capita when we hold account 
of household size, or in other words when the unit of observation is the individual and not the 
                                                             
26 See Nichols (2008). 
27 A total of 1781 households are included in the original PSF sample. Three households have been dropped due to 
completely incoherent expenditure records. Three others have been excluded due to their head sharing his time 
between several households, which raised doubt on the correct allocation of his declared expenditure. One 
household was dropped due to incoherent recording of members’ relationship with the head and another five 
households, because though they include two cells, the surveyor recorded all expenditure in the head’s cell. 
Finally, seven households could not be included due to missing information on some key variable. We end up with 
a total sample size of 1762 households kept in the analysis. 
28 PSF Households with exceedingly high levels of expenditures have been screened and, when possible, their 
records corrected case-by-case based on information provided by other variables in the survey. No such work 
could be done on the ESPS data since the available information is more limited. The maximum level of annual 
expenditure per capita in PSF is found around 5,810,000 CFA (that is about $11,500 in 2006-2007). In ESPS the 
maximum amount is around 13,780,000 CFA ($27,300), but only eight households out of 13559 have values 
higher than the PSF maximum. We kept these observations in the sample as very wealthy households are more 
likely to be included in ESPS than PSF, due to the much larger sample size. 
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household. On average, the level of expenditure per capita is found higher in PSF than in ESPS by 
about 15%.29  
                                                             
29 The average household size is found lower in PSF than in ESPS: 7.96 members versus 9.11. This results from a 
higher proportion of one cell households in PSF (13.9% versus 10.6% in ESPS) and could impact the comparison if 
larger households have on average a lower level of consumption per capita. In order to control for this possible 
source of bias, we run the same comparisons using household structure and household size as extra covariates in 
the logit regression used to build propensity score weights. Doing this, we can compare expenditure levels 
between households which on average share the same location, structure and size. This does not have a large 
impact on the estimates. 
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Table A2.1: average value of household food consumption per capita 
 by household structure - all food commodities 
 PSF survey ESPS survey Difference  
 Mean Mean PSF-ESPS  
Household type (N) (N) (Std. err.) 
Single person households 570,530 502,432 68,098 
 (98) (540) (38,759) 
Other one cell households 289,300 262,873 26,427 
 (147) (901) (16,621) 
More than one cell 'nuclear' hh. 217,181 193,024 24,156 
 (549) (3,971) (17,379) 
Other households 181,343 150,434 30,909 
 (968) (8,147) (5,321) 
All households 223,162 181,548 41,614 
 (1,762) (13,559) (6,746) 
Source: PSF and ESPS surveys, authors' calculations. In the first two columns, the sample size is 
reported between parentheses. In the third column, the standard error of the difference is 
reported. 
 
Table A2.2: average value of household total consumption per capita 
 by household structure - all commodities 
 PSF survey ESPS survey Difference  
 Mean Mean PSF-ESPS  
Household type (N) (N) (Std. err.) 
Single person households 1,086,946 1,000,344 86,602 
 (98) (540) (84,672) 
Other one cell households 531,182 535,947 -4,764 
 (147) (901) (52,169) 
More than one cell 'nuclear' hh. 392,651 351,172 41,479 
 (549) (3,971) (22,022) 
Other households 367,697 301,915 65,783 
 (968) (8,147) (14,561) 
All households 429,115 371,231 57,884 
 (1,762) (13,559) (12,859) 
All individuals 328,135 284,917 43,218 
 (13,988) (123,486) (3,519) 
Source: PSF and ESPS surveys, authors' calculations. In the first two columns, the sample size is 
reported between parentheses. In the third column, the standard error of the difference is 
reported. 
 
3. Poverty and inequality 
 
We now compare the values of poverty and inequality indices obtained with the two surveys. Two 
poverty lines are considered. The lowest, « nutrition », line corresponds to the level of expenditure 
necessary to purchase enough food to attain a minimum caloric intake of 2400 kcal per adult 
equivalent and per day. Since in PSF we do not have a reliable set of price data, we use the poverty 
lines computed by Ndoye et al. (2009), that we update using the average inflation rate between the 
ESPS and PSF surveys. The second line corresponds to the satisfaction of individual basic needs. It 
is computed using the average non-food per adult equivalent expenditure of households for which 
food consumption per adult equivalent is between 0.95 and 1.05 the nutrition poverty line. This 
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average is added to the nutrition threshold to obtain the basic needs line. Table A3.1 reports the 
values of the poverty thresholds for Dakar, other towns and rural areas.30 
 
Table A3.1: Nutrition and basic needs poverty lines 
 Nutrition poverty line Basic needs poverty line 
Dakar 396 835 
Other towns 369 647 
Rural areas 356 558 
Source: PSF survey, authors' calculations. Values are given in CFA francs. 
 
Using these thresholds, we can compute FGT indexes for both the PSF and ESPS surveys. The 
results are reported in table A3.2. Not much difference is found between the values of the FGT 
indexes. PSF finds more people under the nutrition threshold (16.7% versus 12.5%), but less under 
the basic needs one (42.8% versus 45%). 
  
Table A3.2: FGT indexes for PSF and ESPS surveys 
 Nutrition poverty line Basic needs poverty line 
Index PSF ESPS PSF ESPS 
Poverty headcount 0.167 0.125 0.428 0.450 
Mean poverty gap 0.042 0.027 0.143 0.130 
Mean squared poverty gap 0.016 0.009 0.064 0.052 
Source: PSF and ESPS surveys, authors' calculations based on 13988 and 123486 individual observations 
for PSF and ESPS surveys respectively 
 
 
Looking now at inequality, we computed the Gini index for both surveys. Here the two surveys 
lead to widely different measures of the extent of inequalities between individual levels of 
consumption per capita in Senegal: while, according to ESPS, inequality appears relatively low, 
with a Gini equal to 38.9, PSF finds it at a much higher level (Gini=47.1). These results are 
confirmed by figure A1 in which we plot kernel density estimates of PSF and ESPS distributions of 
log-consumption per capita. The graph shows that compared to ESPS, distribution in PSF is 
skewed towards the right and high values of consumption per capita. This is not surprising given 
that addressing the consumption questionnaire to more than one adult in the household is more 
likely to lead to higher values of consumption in relatively wealthy households. 
                                                             
30 We repeated the same exercise on the ESPS sample. The resulting basic needs thresholds are at bit lower than 
those of PSF (507, 592 and 780 CFA per adult equivalent and per day for rural areas, other towns and Dakar 
respectively). 
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Appendix B: Differences between poverty and inequality measures 
The rationale for using bootstrap to evaluate the significance of differences between poverty and 
inequality indices is provided by Biewen (2002). Asymptotic normality of the interdecile, 
interquartile, mean logarithmic deviation, and Theil indices can be established using the delta-
method (Green, 2000). Kakwani (1993) provides the same results for the headcount poverty and the 
poverty gap indices. For the Gini index, see Xu (2007). In this Appendix, we reproduce in Tables 
B1 and B2 the estimated differences between inequality indices, based on per capita consumption, 
and between poverty indices, based on per adult equivalent consumption. Similar results for 
inequality indices based on per adult equivalent consumption are available upon request but not 
shown. 
Table B1: Differences between inequality indices from Table 3 
 Gini 90/10 75/25 Mean log 
dev 
Theil-T 
All consumption 2.56*** 1.02*** 0.10 0.05*** 0.07*** 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) 
Non-food consumption 4.44*** 6.91*** 0.68*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 
 (0.33) (1.00) (0.21) (0.01) (0.02) 
Food consumption 1.22*** 0.55*** 0.10** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sources: PSF survey, N=1762, authors' calculations. Bootstrap standard errors (250 replications). *,**,***: significant at the 10%, %, 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
D
en
si
ty
10 12 14 16 18
Log-household per capita expenditure
 ESPS distribution  PSF distribution
Source: ESPS and PSF data, authors calculations.
Gaussian kernel density estimates, with 50 estimation points.
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Figure A.1: ESPS and PSF densities for household per capita expenditure
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1% level. 
 Table B2: Differences between poverty indices from table 8 
 Nutrition poverty line Basic needs poverty line 
 Headcount Poverty gap Headcount Poverty gap  
 index index index index 
National 1.56*** 0.88*** 3.51*** 1.78*** 
 (0.45) (0.12) (0.64) (0.15) 
Dakar 0.29 0.16*** 3.56*** 1.63*** 
 (0.39) (0.06) (1.14) (0.22) 
Other urban areas     2.07** 0.95*** 3.43*** 1.62*** 
 (1.01) (0.31) (1.26) (0.30) 
Rural areas 2.19*** 1.34*** 3.51*** 1.95*** 
 (0.81) (0.20) (0.99) (0.24) 
Source: PSF survey, authors' calculations. N=1762 households and 4293 cells. Bootstrap standard errors (250 
replications) between parentheses. *,**,***: significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
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Appendix C: inequality measures, using per adult equivalent consumption. 
Table C1: Inequality measures, on per adult equivalent consumption. 
 Gini 90/10 75/25 Mean log 
dev 
Theil-T 
Per capita household 
consumption 
     
Total consumption 45.28 7.14 2.84 0.35 0.40 
 (1.10) (0.35) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) 
Non-food consumption 61.55 17.91 4.99 0.73 0.79 
 (1.29) (0.90) (0.24) (0.03) (0.05) 
Food consumption 37.36 5.52 2.31 0.23 0.24 
 (0.70) (0.25) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) 
Per capita cell consumption      
Total consumption 47.25*** 7.90*** 2.86 0.38*** 0.45*** 
 (1.05) (0.39) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) 
Non-food consumption 65.32*** 22.97*** 5.47** 0.85*** 0.94*** 
 (1.15) (1.59) (0.24) (0.03) (0.05) 
Food consumption 38.41*** 5.88*** 2.39** 0.25*** 0.26*** 
 (0.68) (0.26) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) 
Source: PSF survey, N=1762, authors’ calculations. Bootstrap standard errors (250 replications) between parentheses. . *,**,***: 
difference with per adult eq. household consumption inequality measure is significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% level (see Note 9 and 
Appendix B for details). 
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Table C2: Inequality decomposition, per adult equivalent consumption 
 Theil 
within 
Theil 
between 
Share within 
Scale A    
Total consumption 0.06 0.39 12.30 
 (0.01) (0.03) (1.36) 
Non-food consumption 0.15 0.79 15.89 
 (0.01) (0.05) (1.69) 
Food consumption 0.01 0.24 5.66 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.67) 
Scale B    
Total consumption 0.05 0.38 11.99 
 (0.01) (0.03) (1.34) 
Non-food consumption 0.14 0.77 15.67 
 (0.01) (0.05) (1.67) 
Food consumption 0.01 0.24 5.39 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.63) 
Scale C    
Total consumption 0.06 0.40 12.14 
 (0.01) (0.03) (1.32) 
Non-food consumption 0.15 0.79 15.89 
 (0.01) (0.05) (1.69) 
Food consumption 0.01 0.26 5.50 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.65) 
Scale A – without education 
expenditure 
   
Total consumption 0.06 0.39 12.97 
 (0.01) (0.03) (1.37) 
Non-food consumption 0.16 0.80 16.97 
 (0.02) (0.05) (1.64) 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. N=1763 households and 4293 cells. Bootstrap 
standard errors (250 replications) between parentheses. Scale A: adult: 1; child 0 to 14: 0.5; 
Scale B: adult: 1: child 5 to 14: 0.5; child 0 to 4: 0.2; Scale C: male adult: 1; female adult: 
0.83; boy 5 to 14: 0.77; girl 5 to 14: 0.71; child 0 to 4: 0.52 for food consumption; scale A 
weights for non-food consumption. 
 
 
 
Table C3: Sensitivity of FGT indices to equivalence scales 
 Nutrition poverty line Basic needs poverty line 
Scale Headcount Poverty 
gap 
Squared 
poverty gap 
Headcount Poverty gap Squared 
poverty gap 
Household per adult equivalent 
consumption 
    
Scale A 0.167 0.042 0.016 0.428 0.143 0.064 
Scale B 0.145 0.035 0.012 0.390 0.125 0.054 
Scale C 0.183 0.046 0.017 0.435 0.148 0.068 
Cell per adult equivalent consumption     
Scale A 0.182 0.051 0.020 0.463 0.160 0.075 
Scale B 0.159 0.043 0.016 0.430 0.140 0.063 
Scale C 0.196 0.055 0.022 0.469 0.167 0.079 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. N=1763 households and 4293 cells. Bootstrap standard errors (250 replications) between 
parentheses. Scale A: adult: 1; child 0 to 14: 0.5; Scale B: adult: 1: child 5 to 14: 0.5; child 0 to 4: 0.2; Scale C: male adult: 1; female 
adult: 0.83; boy 5 to 14: 0.77; girl 5 to 14: 0.71; child 0 to 4: 0.52 for food consumption; scale A weights for non-food consumption. 
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Appendix D: Sensitivity of poverty comparison estimates to the choice of poverty line 
Figures D.1a to D.1c below show the estimated difference between the poverty rates 
obtained with the cell and household consumption per adult equivalent depending on the 
position of the poverty line. 31 As we can see, the difference between poverty rates is 
significant for a large range of poverty lines. 
 
 
                                                             
31 Graphs have been drawn using Stata command cfgts2d from the DASP Package and available on line at 
http://dasp.ecn.ulaval.ca/ (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
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Source: PSF survey, authors' calculations. N=4340 individuals. The graph shows the estimated
difference between poverty rates based on cell versus household consumption per adult equivalent.
Equivalence scale: 0.5: children 0 to 14 years old; 1: adults
Figure D.1a
Dakar
Difference between poverty rates as a function of the poverty threshold
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Figure D.1b
Other urban areas
Difference between poverty rates as a function of the poverty threshold
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Figure D.1c
Rural areas
Difference between poverty rates as a function of the poverty threshold
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Appendix E: Additional results. 
Appendix E1: Correlates of within household inequality, consumption deciles. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Theil within Theil within -food Theil within –nonfood 
    
Dakar -0.0163 0.00299 -0.105*** 
 (0.0120) (0.00749) (0.0215) 
Other urban areas -0.00801 0.00341 -0.0680*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00536) (0.0199) 
o.decile_cons 1 - - - 
    
decile_cons 2 0.0331*** 0.0150 0.0582** 
 (0.00996) (0.00971) (0.0273) 
decile_cons 3 0.0117 -0.00884 0.0797*** 
 (0.00814) (0.00552) (0.0263) 
decile_cons 4 0.0160** -0.00184 0.0513** 
 (0.00730) (0.00607) (0.0254) 
decile_cons 5 0.0312*** 0.00501 0.0964*** 
 (0.00918) (0.00880) (0.0282) 
decile_cons 6 0.0378*** 0.00435 0.0855*** 
 (0.00998) (0.00666) (0.0276) 
decile_cons 7 0.0444*** -0.00148 0.110*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00772) (0.0261) 
decile_cons 8 0.0565*** 0.000743 0.115*** 
 (0.0124) (0.00909) (0.0257) 
decile_cons 9 0.0837*** -0.00596 0.180*** 
 (0.0163) (0.00641) (0.0302) 
decile_cons 10 0.0888*** -0.0116 0.148*** 
 (0.0226) (0.00774) (0.0362) 
Household size -0.000567 0.00124 -0.00320 
 (0.00171) (0.00143) (0.00317) 
Nb of cells in the hh 0.000173 0.00389 0.000964 
 (0.00550) (0.00243) (0.0125) 
Nb of children 0-4 y.o 0.00438 -0.00117 0.0144** 
 (0.00324) (0.00265) (0.00666) 
Nb of children 5-14 y.o 0.00570** -0.00192 0.0172*** 
 (0.00269) (0.00191) (0.00581) 
Nb of women 15-65 y.o. -0.00326 -0.00466** -0.00253 
 (0.00315) (0.00192) (0.00616) 
Nb of elderly 66+ y.o 0.00400 -0.00124 0.00140 
 (0.00628) (0.00332) (0.0115) 
2-cell hh, head + other -0.0239*** -0.000737 -0.0791*** 
 (0.00777) (0.00573) (0.0159) 
3+-cell hh: head and wives. 0.0211* 0.00360 0.0616** 
 (0.0107) (0.00817) (0.0279) 
3+-cell hh: head, wife(wives), + other 0.0209* -0.00306 0.0349 
 (0.0110) (0.00417) (0.0220) 
3+-cell hh: head + others (no spouse) -0.0240** -0.0198*** -0.0448** 
 (0.00972) (0.00586) (0.0207) 
All meals taken together -0.0537*** -0.0783*** -0.0371* 
 (0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0201) 
Constant 0.0528*** 0.0722*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0165) (0.0463) 
    
Observations 1,426 1,426 1,426 
R-squared 0.105 0.162 0.111 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ calculations. N=1426 households with at least two cells. OLS regressions. 
Additional controls: religion and ethnicity of the household head. Reference category for household structure is a 
household with two cells: head and spouse. 2-cell hh: head + other refers to households composed of 2 cells, 
where the second cell is not that of the head’s spouse. 3+-cell hh: head and wives refers to polygamous 
households, where all the cells are headed by member of the conjugal unit. 3+-cell hh: head, wife(wives) + other 
refers to households with at least 3 cells and where at least one of the cells is not headed by a spouse of the head. 
3+-cell hh: head+others (no wife) refers to households with more than 3 cells and where none of them is headed 
by a spouse of the household head. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E2: Probability of being a non-poor household with poor members 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All 80% richest hh – 
non-poor 
20% poorest hh – 
non-poor 
    
Dakar 11.71*** 2.221***  
 (4.371) (0.675)  
Other urban area 2.496*** 1.620 7.814 
 (0.799) (0.546) (11.29) 
nb of children 0 - 4 y.o. 0.873 0.903 0.767 
 (0.0950) (0.0932) (0.303) 
nb of children 5 - 14 y.o. 1.003 1.147 0.479** 
 (0.0880) (0.0995) (0.155) 
nb of elderly over 66 y.o. 0.807 0.713 1.521 
 (0.167) (0.154) (1.011) 
hh head is polygamous 1.056 1.151 0.408 
 (0.278) (0.308) (0.325) 
Hh size 1.001 1.020 1.440 
 (0.0534) (0.0501) (0.337) 
hh head has no formal schooling 1.253 2.218*** 1.022 
 (0.319) (0.560) (0.797) 
Nb of cells 1.283 1.093 2.079 
 (0.231) (0.198) (1.680) 
2-cell hh, head + other 0.807 0.759 2.256 
 (0.329) (0.338) (2.563) 
3+-cell hh: head and wives. 1.700 1.133 0.749 
 (0.792) (0.555) (0.948) 
3+-cell hh: head, wife(wives), + other 2.906*** 3.008*** 1.193 
 (1.004) (1.028) (1.297) 
3+-cell hh: head + others (no wife) 1.020 0.793 0.106 
 (0.521) (0.403) (0.204) 
All meals taken together 0.288*** 0.389*** 0.381 
 (0.0829) (0.101) (0.384) 
Log hh  per adult eq consumption 0.00551***   
 (0.00283)   
Dakar = o,   - 
    
Constant 7.12e+27*** 0.0538*** 0.204 
 (4.595e+28) (0.0255) (0.337) 
    
Observations 876 793 83 
Source PSF survey, author’s calculations. Logit estimates, odd ratios reported; coefficient standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E3 Probability that all meals are taken jointly in the household 
  
VARIABLES All meals 
shared 
  
decile_cons1 1.925* 
 (0.753) 
decile_cons2 1.083 
 (0.356) 
decile_cons3 0.868 
 (0.262) 
decile_cons4 1.322 
 (0.422) 
decile_cons5 0.845 
 (0.235) 
decile_cons6 1.012 
 (0.282) 
decile_cons7 0.902 
 (0.235) 
decile_cons8 0.793 
 (0.197) 
decile_cons9 0.855 
 (0.204) 
  
Dakar 0.670** 
 (0.122) 
Other urban area 0.783 
 (0.148) 
Nb of cells 1.312** 
 (0.144) 
Nb of couples in the household 0.662*** 
 (0.0940) 
2-cell hh: head+wife. 1.708*** 
 (0.285) 
2-cell hh : head + other 1.510* 
 (0.367) 
3+-cell hh : head, wife(wives) + other 1.549* 
 (0.352) 
Hh head is polygamous 1.074 
 (0.172) 
Nb of children 0 – 4 y.o. 0.870** 
 (0.0556) 
Nb of children 5 - 14 y.o. 0.969 
 (0.0415) 
Nb of women 15 - 65 0.893** 
 (0.0452) 
Nb of elderly over 66 y.o.  0.867 
 (0.111) 
Constant 4.407*** 
 (1.136) 
  
Observations 1,762 
Source : PSF survey, authors’ calculations. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0. Logit estimates. Odd ratios reported. 
Coeff. standard errors in parentheses. Top consumption 
decile as a reference category. 
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Appendix F: Simulating the impact of measurement error on intra-household 
inequality. 
 
 
The exercise is the following. Assume that the true distribution of consumption is such that 
there is no intra-household inequality. Nevertheless, because of (classical) measurement 
errors at the cell level, the observed per capita cell consumption differs from the per capita 
household consumption. We simulate the observed distribution of per capita cell 
consumption varying the magnitude of the error term, by drawing it from a normal 
distribution with a variance chosen as a percentage of the variance of the original 
distribution of log-consumption. This percentage varies from 10 to 80%.  From this 
simulated cell consumption data, we compute again both the per capita household 
consumption and the per capita cell consumption. We then calculate the Gini and Theil 
indices of the 2 distributions and assess the variance of the white noise that would be 
enough to explain a level of intra-household inequality equal to 14.6% of total inequality. 
We replicate the simulation 100 times to compute the standard errors of the indices. We 
will not focus on the total level of inequality, as the addition of such white noise will 
mechanically increase it. 
Table F.1. below gives the result of these simulations. It appears that it requires an error 
term with a variance fixed at 70% of the variance of the original distribution of log-
consumption for the decomposition of the Theil index to indicate a within-household share 
of total inequality of 14%. At 40%, the Gini index for the distribution of per capita cell 
consumption is 2.75% higher than the one for the per capita household consumption, as we 
actually observe in our data (2.56%). In both cases, such levels of measurement error are 
unrealistically large compared to the 20% benchmark mentioned above, so that we are 
confident measurement error is not the only force driving our results. 
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Table F.1.: Simulated inequality measures in the presence of measurement error 
𝜎2(uc)/𝜎2(lnYh) Per capita 
household 
consumption 
Per capita cell consumption 
 Gini Gini Theil Theil within Share of 
within 
inequality 
10% 48.83 
(0.39) 
49.61 
(0.39) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.03 
20% 49.65 
(0.52) 
51.16 
(0.50) 
0.53 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.06 
30% 50.60 
(0.66) 
52.78 
(0.63) 
0.57 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.08 
40% 51.37 
(0.82) 
54.12 
(0.75) 
0.60 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.10 
50% 52.10 
(0.79) 
55.41 
(0.73) 
0.63 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.11 
60% 52.79 
(0.82) 
56.57 
(0.77) 
0.65 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.13 
70% 53.61 
(0.90) 
57.86 
(0.82) 
0.69 
(0.04) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
0.14 
80% 54.40 
(1.13) 
59.04 
(1.01) 
0.72 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.15 
Source: PSF survey, authors’ simulated distributions, 100 replications, standard errors between parentheses. 
 
